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 The main objective of this dissertation is to study the connection between the 
fiscal policy stance and four variables: Fiscal Rules; Government Decentralization; 
Financial Stress; Electoral Calendar. The empirical analysis had as sample the 28 member 
countries of the European Union and covers the period between 1990 and 2017. The 
estimators used were the Ordinary Least Squares and the Two-Stage Least Squares for 
an unbalanced panel dataset. Provided the database and the estimation method, we 
tested the hypothesis of a positive connection between the fiscal policy stance 
indicators (primary balance, primary expenditure and cyclically adjusted primary 
balance) and a high number of fiscal rules application; a high level of government 
decentralization; a lower financial stress index; inexistence of parliamentary elections in 
the year of analysis. 
 According with the results obtained throughout this study, we found a negative 
relation between the fiscal policy stance and the taxation decentralization level. Besides, 
we discovered that in the years with an increase in the financial stress the indicators of 
fiscal policy stance showed a deterioration in their levels. Regarding the rest of the 
studied variables, no statistically significant result was obtained to prove any relation 
between them and the budgetary outcomes. 
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 In the last decade, the European Union member countries have faced the worst 
economic recession ever since its creation and the impact that it had on the public 
budgets has raised some concerns about their sustainability and led public debt to 
record values (Tagkalakis, 2012). After the intervention of the policy makers, came the 
monetary authority (ECB) that with the adoption of flexible policies reverted the cycle 
of recession that was installed in the EU (Beyer et al., 2017). However, such intervention 
by the monetary authorities has exhausted almost all the options of these institutions 
to support the future economic growth and reverse the next negative cycle of the 
economy, which highlights the relevance of the fiscal policy for the future.1. 
It is with this scenario that we considered relevant to distinguish which ones are 
the main variables of the fiscal policy that might improve it or restrain it. The most 
studied are the fiscal rules; the financial crisis; the electoral cycle and the degree of 
government decentralization (Afonso & Hauptmeier, 2009; Tagkalakis, 2012). 
 In the European Union, each country conducts its own fiscal policy, which means 
that in an economic union this fact could generate some malfunction within its stability 
if a member country did not maintain a proper fiscal discipline. Consequently, the 
European institutions have created some supranational rules within the Stability and 
Growth Pact in 1997 to ensure that such discipline is kept2. Therefore, it is of most 
relevance to assess the impact of such rules have had in the budget balances.  
 
1 See the President of the ECB recent declarations. 
2 Protocol 12 of the TFEU provides further details on the excessive deficit procedure, including the 
reference values on deficit and debt. 
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 Besides the fiscal rules, in the last years there has been an increasing interest by 
the governments and by the public finance literature in fiscal decentralization programs. 
These are based on the redistribution of expenditure functions and/or transference of 
some revenue sources to the local governments. In the European Union, there are 
countries that have also decided to adopt such strategy to improve their efficiency and 
reduce their deficits with such gains. Member countries such as Germany, Spain or 
Belgium are characterized by a higher fiscal decentralization (Afonso & Hauptmeier, 
2009). So, it is important to study whether a more decentralized country can ensure 
better fiscal results.  
 Another well-known potential determinant of the fiscal policy is the significance 
of the electoral cycles. According with the literature, there are two different models that 
support the idea that the electoral cycles might have an impact on the fiscal policy, the 
“opportunistic” and the “partisan” (Alesina & Roubini, 1992). The opportunistic models 
defend that the policy makers tend to maximize their popularity in the previous year of 
election to ensure its re-election, while the partisan ones argue that when in power 
different parties defend different interests and therefore, the macroeconomic results 
might be different based on distinct fiscal policies.  
 All these topics are based on political decisions or derived from it. However, one 
cannot ignore the impact of certain events such as the financial crisis caused by the 
Subprime speculation. Such incident, led to many difficulties of the financial system in 
keeping their support to the economy and have forced many governments to intervene 
in some of those institutions to avoid a further contamination to the whole system 
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(Tagkalakis, 2012). These interventions included equity injections, subsidies, asset 
purchases and loan guarantees, with the losses of the banking sector being covered by 
the governments that were forced to assume large deficits not only caused by these 
assistances, but also by the automatic stabilizers that stood negative due to the social 
impacts of the crisis.  
 It is with these four main variables that we developed this study that not only 
covers a wider time-period when compared with the previous ones, but also uses 
different sources to some of the variables that provide a more accurate information 
about their impact on the fiscal policy. 
The structure of this work can be described as it follows: In section 2 we provide 
a literature review in which we describe the previous studies related with the fiscal 
policy stance and its relationship with the four variables that we are now analysing. The 
section 3 provides a summary regarding all the variables and dataset that we will use in 
the empirical study. In section 4, it is described our approach and model used to provide 
an empirical analysis and are presented the main outcomes of it. Section 5 summarizes 
the main conclusions of this dissertation. 
2. Related literature 
2.1. Fiscal Rules 
 Several different authors have defended and concluded that fiscal outcomes are 
influenced by these four variables, although the obtained results are not always the 
same. In the literature, there have been several attempts to explain the effects of the 
numerical fiscal rules on the fiscal policy (Ayuso et al., 2007; Debrun et al., 2008; 
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Szymanska, 2016) including some who have concluded that the expenditure rules (that 
regulate the level of public expenditure) are much more effective (Ayuso, 2012), given 
that this part of the public budget is much easier to control by the governments. 
 The most usual definition of a fiscal rule cited by the literature is the one 
defended by Kopits & Symansky (1998), that specifies a fiscal rule as a permanent 
constraint on fiscal policy characterized in terms of an indicator of overall fiscal 
performance. These authors have also classified the fiscal policy rules in three major 
types, the balanced-budget or deficit rules, the borrowing rules and the debt or reserve 
rules. 
The application of such rules may generate trade-offs, as Debrun et al. (2008) 
defended. The first one is associated to the fact that these (mainly the balanced-budget 
ones) can create a tension between the objective of a proper fiscal discipline and the 
adoption of a certain fiscal positions appropriated to the economic cycle. The second 
trade-off is related to the relation between low deficits and the preservation of enough 
public investment to maintain a proper supply of public goods. There is also another 
trade-off associated to the fiscal rules that might compromise the budgetary 
transparency, due to the fact that these can lead to lower official deficits values thanks 
to one-off measures, operations outside the budget and via creative accountability. 
In general, all outcomes point to a positive impact of the fiscal rules on the 
budgetary balances. Ayuso et al. (2007) has concluded that there is link between 
numerical rules and the public budget balances, in which an increase in the share of 
government finances covered by such rules leads to lower deficits. Afonso & Guimarães 
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(2014) showed that countries with a higher fiscal rules index tend to have better 
cyclically adjusted primary balances, however there was no evidences that the causality 
runs from the fiscal rule index (FRI) to the CAPB results. Debrun et al. (2008) was also 
able to find such connection, though the impact of the fiscal rules weakens when the 
dependent variable is the level of public debt instead of the budget balance. Afonso & 
Hauptmeier (2009) has detailed that the existence of fiscal rules positively contributes 
to a higher responsiveness of primary surpluses to government indebtedness. 
Ayuso (2012) has dedicated his study to the impact of the fiscal rules on the 
expenditure side and tried to describe the reason behind the fact that these rules seem 
to be more effective than the others. The expenditure rules characteristics allow better 
control of the public finances, since, according with the author, the expense side of the 
government budget is the one that the policy makers are able to control in a most direct 
form. These types of rules are simpler to formulate and control, which allows a better 
transparency on the governments’ accountability. Afonso & Guimarães (2014) could 
also conclude that an expenditure rule index was able to explain the developments of 
the public primary expenditure, and therefore makes the development of more rules 
focused on that side of the budget justifiable. 
2.2. Government Decentralization 
 Alongside with the fiscal rules, the degree of government decentralization has 
been the subject of many studies of its impact on the public finances of a country. Over 
the years, the number of countries that are adopting decentralization policies are 
increasing (Mello, 2000), however what’s truly happening, according with Oates (1999) 
is an increasing complexity and specialization of the structure of the public sector. 
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The idea that a higher decentralization level leads to benefits in a country has its 
origin in two different models. Baskaran (2010) shows that these models are the 
Theorem of the Decentralization and the Public Choice. The first one defends that a  
decentralized offer of public goods is capable of solving the problems of several 
inhabitants and regions with different cultures, while the second refers the importance 
that a separated state has on the economy due to a competition between regions that 
restricts the ability to reduce or increase taxes. 
Some studies point to a successful result of that strategy in terms of the level of 
public debt (Baskaran, 2010; Horováthová et al., 2012). Mello (2000) claims that a 
decentralized country can obtain gains of efficiency and a reduction on the costs of 
information and transaction due to the fact that a local government has a better 
knowledge of the true needs of their population than a centralized government.  
 However, the decentralization also has its disadvantages. Prud’homme (1995) 
has tried to identify the negative side of that procedure. The first weakness of a 
decentralization process to the public finances, according with that author, is the idea 
that the decentralization leads to gains of efficiency, which according with his study, can 
be criticised because this fact assumes several hypotheses that are not always suitable 
to a developing country, and it focus solely on the efficiency in the demand side but 
ignores the one on the supply side. The author also refers that with the decentralization, 
the level of corruption on a country will increase, since it is more likely that it happens 
on a local level than in a national level.  
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Baskaran (2010) also presented some disadvantages of a decentralization 
process, which includes, a restrained central government that has a lower ability to 
conduct stabilization policies, and a competition between regions that may lead to 
higher deficits in a local level.  
The most common method of measuring the decentralization level of a country 
is the share of the local governments spending and/or revenue on the national budget 
(Afonso & Hauptmeier, 2009). Stegarescu (2005) defends an alternative way to assess 
the level of decentralization in a country, in which the vertical structure of the 
government has more importance than the one that is given by the conventional 
method. The fact that a government concedes higher shares of revenue/expenditure of 
the public budget to local governments does not necessarily means a higher 
decentralization level, since the action of the lower levels of government may be 
restrained by certain rules of the central government. 
2.3. Political Cycle 
 The importance that the political cycle has on the balance of the public budget 
has been studied throughout the years based on the initial work of Nordhaus (1974) 
relating the economic cycle and the political cycle according with the elections. In the 
pre-election periods, there is an improvement in the level of unemployment in the 
countries under review, whereas after the elections this level has deteriorated, which 
means that in a perfect democracy with retrospective evaluation of the parties it is 
possible to claim that they tend to take unfair decisions to the future generations. The 
author also claims that there is a predictable pattern of policy in which, there is a relative 
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austerity in the early years of the mandate, and it ends with an expansionary policy 
before the elections. 
 Alesina & Roubini (1992) differentiate the two models that appear in the 
literature about the political cycle in the opportunistic or the partisan incentives of the 
policymakers. The first one defends that a policymaker maximizes its popularity or the 
probability of re-election, while the second shows that different parties in power will 
lead consequently to different policies according with their supporting groups. In the 
results obtained in their study there is no opportunist cycle on the part of the 
governments that relates the occurrence of elections with the level of output and/or the 
level of unemployment. However, there is a political cycle associated with the type of 
elected government that has some influence on the economic cycle. 
Afonso & Hauptmeier (2009) were also able to identify a negative influence that 
a coming election has on the improvement of the primary balance, as a response to 
higher levels of debt. The same effect was verified on the CAPB, however the primary 
spending almost did not suffer any modifications under the same conditions. 
2.4. Financial Stress 
Recently, an increasing number of studies about the impact of the financial crisis 
on the fiscal stance of different countries was done. Tagkalakis (2012) has concluded 
that a financial crisis leads to an increase in the debt stock and the size of the financial 
sector significantly affects the negative effects of such event. Furceri & Zdzienicka (2010) 
were also able to find a negative relation in which bank crises are associated with a 
significant and lasting increase in public debt.  
Pedro D. T. Coelho  The determinants of the fiscal policy stance: Evidence  
from the EU countries 
9 
 
Tagkalakis (2012) showed that such negative impacts of the financial crisis have 
had its origins in the support packages that governments were forced to give to the 
financial system in order to prevent a systematic impact of the financial crisis in all the 
sectors of the economy of a country.  
It is based on the outcomes obtained by these authors that we can stablish a 
connection between the fiscal policy stance and the four variables that we will analyse 
in the following sections. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
 The database developed for this study covers annual data of the 28 European 
Union member countries between 1990 and 20173: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.  
Most of the information regarding the macroeconomic variables were collected 
from the AMECO dataset (Table B. I) whereas the data regarding decentralization of the 
government was collected from the Eurostat database. The CLIFS – Country-Level Index 
of Financial Stress developed by the European Central Bank was used as measurement 
for financial market crisis indicator, while the information regarding the electoral 
calendar of the member countries was collected using the data provided by Döring, 
 
3 To cover all the stages of the European integration and taking into account that this was the maximum 
timespan of some datasets, a time period of 1990-2017 was considered, though for most of the countries 
there´s a lack of macroeconomic information before 1995. 
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Holger & Manow (2018). To assess the impact of the fiscal rules on the fiscal policy 
stance it was used the Standardised Fiscal Rules Index4 published by the European 
Commission.  
3.2 Fiscal Policy Stance 
 To evaluate the fiscal policy stance of the EU member countries we used two 
governmental indicators, the primary balance and the primary expenditure. The primary 
balance its used due to a broader coverage that it has of all the components of the public 
budget, while at the same time excludes the impact of the interest related expenditures 
that the government it is not capable to control directly (Afonso & Hauptmeier, 2009). 
Following some studies (Afonso & Guimarães, 2014; Debrun et al., 2008), we also 
complemented our analysis using the primary expenditure as a good indicator of the 
fiscal policy stance, given that the expenditures side of the government budget can be 
easily controlled by the public authorities when compared with the revenues. 
 Afterwards, we used the cyclically adjusted primary balance5 as a robustness test 
to our model due to the direct link that it has with the primary balance. The main 
difference of these indicators is the fact that the CAPB excludes all the effects that might 
be associated to the cyclical behaviour of the economy and therefore expose the part of 
the public budget that is connected to the government policies. 
3.3 Fiscal Rules 
 The use of an index to evaluate the impact that the fiscal rules might have in the 
fiscal position of the governments is widely proposed by previous studies (Afonso & 
 
4 This index is obtained based on each rule strength, coverage and weight. 
5 Szymanska (2016) and other authors have also used this indicator as a dependent fiscal variable.  
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Guimarães, 2014; Afonso & Hauptmeier, 2009; Szymanska, 2016). In this study we used 
the FRI computed and compiled by the European Commission. This index is based on 
information that the EC collected directly from the European Union member countries. 
The Commission took into consideration all types of numerical fiscal rules at all levels of 
the government from 1990 until 2017. 
 According with this dataset the number of numerical fiscal rules has considerably 
increased when compared the number of rules in force at the beginning of the 1990s to 
the ones in 2017 (Graph B. I). Throughout these years, the majority of these rules were 
focused on the budget-balance and only recently the number of expenditure and debt 
related rules started to increase considerably. The number of revenue rules remain 
residual during the entire dataset.  
Based on the data collected for the year of 2017, most of the rules are put into 
force to the general government and within those, the budget-balance are the most 
commonly applied (Graph B. II). A similar scenario can be found when took into 
consideration the rules applied to the local government (the second most common). 
Only in the central government the budget-balance rules are surpassed by the 
expenditure ones. 
3.4 Government Decentralization 
 The level of decentralization of the 28 EU member countries can be measured in 
three different point of views6 to assess which one might have a bigger impact on the 
fiscal policy of these countries. On our baseline model we estimated the connection 
 
6 Other studies such as Afonso & Hauptmeier (2009) adopted similar methodology. 
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between the fiscal policy and the expenditure decentralization (EXPDEC). Furthermore, 
we also assessed the link between the fiscal stance and the revenue decentralization 
(REVDEC) and taxation decentralization (TAXDEC). 
To determine the level of sub-national share of government for each one of those 
variables we took into consideration the data provided by Eurostat for the total 
expenditure, total revenue and sum of taxes (direct, indirect and capital), for three 
different levels of government (Central - S1311; Regional – S1312; Local – S1313). Data 
regarding the social security (S1314) was also available, however this was not considered 
for this study since it provides an overall service that is not directly linked to decisions 
of the other sub-sectors of the government (Afonso & Hauptmeier, 2009). For any of 
those decentralization variables, we have, for country i and period t: 




 Based on the results obtained in (1) for every EU member countries (Table B. II), 
throughout the period of this analysis it is possible to conclude that countries such as 
Germany and Spain present values above 50% for the share of revenue and expenditure 
allocated to sub-national authorities. On the other hand, countries such as Greece and 
Ireland don’t even reach a 10% level of share in revenues and expenditures of the 
general government. 
3.5 Electoral Cycle 
 To test the relationship between the electoral cycle and the fiscal policy position 
we took into consideration the information provided by the Parlgov database stable 
version of 2018. This dataset is composed by all relevant information that can be 
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retrieved from elections held in all EU and most OECD democracies (37 countries). In its 
wider range, it covers the period of 1901 – 2017 for some countries.  
 Following Afonso & Hauptmeier (2009), the influence of the electoral cycle in the 
fiscal policy stance of the EU member countries can be evaluated by using a dummy 
variable, defined as follows 
(2)      𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  {
 1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡
 
 0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                                                                           
 
3.6 Financial Stress 
 The connection between the financial market indicators and the fiscal policy 
stance is assessed in this study based on the CLIFS, an index published on a monthly 
basis by the European Central Bank for each of the EU member country and it includes 
six, mainly market-based, financial stress measures that capture three financial market 
segments: equity markets, bond markets and foreign exchange markets. In addition, 
when aggregating the sub-indices, the CLIFS takes the co-movement across market 
segments into account. Given the monthly basis of the CLIFS, the variable FSI used in this 
study is computed based on the yearly average of that index. Similar approach was used 
by Tagkalakis (2012), with a different database. 
 The effects of the 2007 – 2008 financial crisis and its subsequent consequences 
can then be evaluated using the information collected in this index. According with the 
data provided by the ECB it is possible to observe that the effects of such event were 
visible not only in the largest economies of the European Union such as Germany, 
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France, United Kingdom and Spain but also in other countries such as Ireland, Portugal 
and Greece (Graph B. III to Graph B. IX). 
3.7 Control Variables 
 To assess the impact of certain events on the fiscal policy stance of the EU 
member countries, a series of Dummy variables were considered. We included the 
following events in our study: 
• The impact of the early stages of the European Monetary Union (1994 – 
1998) was measured using the variable EMU defined as it follows for country 
i and period t (Ayuso et al., 2007; Debrun et al., 2008): 
 (3)              𝐸𝑀𝑈𝑖𝑡 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑓𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑀𝑈
 
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                                                                
 
• The introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact it’s evaluated in this study 
using the variable SGP and it is defined for country i and period t as (Ayuso et 
al., 2007; Debrun et al., 2008): 
 (4)              𝑆𝐺𝑃𝑖𝑡 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 1998 
 
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                                                                               
 
• As an effect of the consecutive enlargements of the European Union after 
2003 it is important to evaluate the impact it has in the new member 
countries. Therefore, the variable ENL was used to assess such impact and it 
is defined for country i and period t as it follows (Ayuso et al., 2007; Debrun 
et al., 2008): 
 (5)              𝐸𝑁𝐿𝑖𝑡 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝐸𝑈 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 2003 
 
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                                                                       
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 As an indicator for the cyclical economic conditions we used the lagged Output 
gap measured as the difference between the actual and potential gross domestic 
product (Tagkalakis, 2012). The lagged Debt-to-GDP was used to control past 
developments in government debt. 
3.8 Descriptive statistics 
 Table I presents the descriptive statistics for the variables considered in this 
study. Furthermore, Table B. IV shows the averages of each variables per country. 
Table I - Descriptive Statistics, 1990-2017 
Variables N MEAN SD MIN MAX 
Primary Balance (%) PB 657 -0.064 3.307 -29.231 9.570 
Primary Expenditure (%) PE 657 42.221 6.415 21.254 62.254 
Cyclically Adjusted 
Primary Balance (%) 
CAPB 644 0.158 3.089 -27.012 9.425 
Debt-to-GDP (%)  Debt 645 55.962 32.685 3.664 178.907 
Output Gap (%) Gap 699 -0.317 3.291 -15.901 17.084 
Expenditure 
Decentralization Level (%) 
EXPDEC 638 27.861 13.742 0.969 63.759 
Revenue Decentralization 
Level (%) 
REVDEC 638 29.318 13.841 1.068 62.883 
Taxation Decentralization 
Level (%) 
TAXDEC 638 14.654 12.543 0 52.168 
Elections Dummy Elections 784 0.269 0.444 0 1 
Financial Stress Index FSI 646 0.131 0.089 0.018 0.603 
Standardised Fiscal Rules 
Index 
Rules 784 0.001 1.001 -0.949 3.404 
European Monetary 
Union Dummy 
EMU 784 0.077 0.266 0 1 
Stability and Growth Pact 
Dummy 
SGP 784 0.357 0.479 0 1 
Enlargement Dummy ENL 784 0.213 0.410 0 1 
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 The average Debt-to-GDP ratio for the 28 EU member countries is 55.962% which 
means that the European governments are fulfilling, on average, the 60% limit7 for this 
macroeconomic indicator stablished by the Stability and Growth Pact. However, as we 
can see in the Table B. IV there are countries such as Greece whose debt level reached, 
on average, more than the double of that limit, which means that as an Euro Area 
member it is not complying with the SGP throughout the period in analysis. 
 In terms of the Decentralization Indexes, it is possible to observe that, on 
average, EU member countries tend to have a higher decentralization levels for 
revenues than for expenditures. Concerning the Output Gap, it presents a negative 
value, which suggests that, on average, the actual economic output is below the 
economy's full capacity for output. 
 Regarding the FSI and considering its range, one can say that, on average, the 
level of financial stress in the EU member countries remain low (since its mean it’s closer 
to the minimum level observed), however one cannot ignore the effect that the financial 
crisis had on this index as we mentioned before.  
 By analysing Table B. III, it is possible to conclude that our baseline model it is 
not affected by Multicollinearity given that none of the correlation coefficients between 
the independent variables shows a value above 0.88.  
 
7 According with the Protocol 12 of the TFEU. 
8 According with Gujarati (2003, p.359) a level of Pearson's correlation coefficient above 0.8 reveals a 
multicollinearity issue in the model. 
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To test the stationarity of the variables, we followed Afonso & Hauptmeier 
(2009) approach and applied the Im-Pesaran-Shin panel unit root test. The results 
(stated in Table B. V), indicate that the Debt variable it’s the only one presenting a 
nonstationary behaviour and therefore, we considered its difference in the model 
(Baskaran, 2010) since it presented a better outcome on the mentioned test. 
4. Empirical Strategy and Results 
4.1 Econometric Approach 
In this empirical study, the main hypothesis that we want to assess are: 
• H1: A higher fiscal rule index (i.e. stronger and wider rules) have a positive 
influence on the government fiscal policy; 
• H2: Higher levels of expenditure decentralization result in better and 
sustainable budgetary behaviour by the member countries; 
• H3: When the member country held parliamentary elections, this event 
resulted in an expansionary fiscal policy by the government in that year; 
• H4: An increase in the financial stress is associated to a deterioration of the 
fiscal policy stance of the EU member country. 
The most common method used to test econometrically the impact of the 
explanatory variables on the fiscal policy of the government is through the creation of a 
fiscal reaction function. According with Bohn (1998), a country fiscal policy can be 
essentially described as the response of the primary balance to three determinants: 
cyclical fluctuations; past developments in government debt; institutional (political) 
determinants or temporary events. 
Pedro D. T. Coelho  The determinants of the fiscal policy stance: Evidence  
from the EU countries 
18 
 
Therefore, to test the hypothesis previously presented, we estimate the 
following equation: 
(6)  𝐹𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝛥𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
                                          𝛽5𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 Where the dependent variable FPS is a proxy for the alternatives measures of the 
fiscal policy stance (primary balance and primary expense) of the member country i (i = 
1, 2, … , 28) and year t (t = 1990, 1991, … , 2017). Whereas the explanatory variables are 
ΔDebt, Gap, EXPDEC, Election, FSI, Rules and Control. ΔDebt stands for the lagged 
change in debt-to-GDP ratio (Tagkalakis, 2012), Gap represents the lagged output gap in 
percentage of the potential GDP, EXPDEC represents the government expenditure 
decentralization, Election represents a dummy variable for the electoral calendar, FSI 
the value of the financial stress index and Rules the value of the fiscal rules index. Control 
represents a set of dummy variables that might have additional explanatory power 
focused on specific events. α represents the individual effects of each country and ε 
stands for a time- and country-specific error term. 
 Considering the absence of data for some variables in certain years and countries 
(we can perceive this fact by analysing the difference between the number of 
observations in Table I), it is possible to conclude that we are estimating an unbalanced 
panel.  Furthermore, we can consider our panel dynamic, given that our model uses 
lagged explanatory variables. Therefore, our panel data assumes a dynamic unbalanced 
specification (Baltagi, 2005). 
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 Based on this consideration, we excluded the LSDVC9 method, since it is not 
compatible with an unbalanced panel data. A Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier 
test for random effects was performed and its results showed that a random effects 
model it was not appropriated. Forwardly, we performed the Modified Wald test for 
groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model and it detected the 
presence of heteroskedasticity and therefore the need to robust our standard errors. 
Following Afonso & Guimarães (2014) we adopted a fixed effects estimator in our 
baseline model. 
4.2 Empirical Results 
 In Table II it is presented the results of the regression based on the fiscal reaction 
function. Firstly, we used the primary balance as our measure of the fiscal policy stance 
and regressed it with each one of the variables independently. From columns (1) – (4) 
of the Table II the results of our regression show that the primary balance is only 
statistically influenced by the financial stress index, i.e. as the FSI increases by 1 the 
Primary Balance tend to be affected by -10.4058% of GDP. The relation between these 
variables supports the idea that in the event of a financial crisis policy makers tend to 
adjust the fiscal policy to reduce the impact of such incident (Tagkalakis, 2012).  
 In column (5) all the variables in study are combined in the regression without 
the control variables for certain events.  The results remain the same as the previous 
ones in terms of statistical significance, with only the FSI presenting a strong statistical 
connection with the dependent variable, with its coefficient showing a negative relation 
between the FSI and the PB. 
 
9 According with the Judson and Owen (1999) approximation. 
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 According with the results presented in column (6), where all variables are 
combined (including the event-related ones), it is possible to conclude that once again 
only the FSI presents a strong statistical relation with the dependent variable. Regarding 
the event-related dummies, a slightly significant coefficient was obtained for both the 
EMU and the ENL, which means that the 15 countries that were on the run to the EMU 
tend to present an improvement in the primary balance as well as the countries that 
joined the EU afterwards. 
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Number of 
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Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***significance at the 1% level; **significance at the 5% level; *significance at the 
10% level 
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 Considering the primary expenditure as our measure for the fiscal policy stance 
the results of the regression using the same fixed effects estimator are presented in 
Table III. 
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575 579 544 579 540 540 
Number of 
Countries 
28 28 28 28 28 28 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  
 In this case, only the FSI variable showed, once again, statistically significant 
coefficients throughout all regressions in which it was used. Given the fact that the 
dependent variable is the primary expenditure, the coefficients for the FSI presented a 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***significance at the 1% level; **significance at the 5% level; 
*significance at the 10% level 
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coherent reversion of the signal. This reversion is explained with the fact that the PE is 
negatively related with the PB (see equation 7) and therefore the results of the 
regressions using the PE as dependent variable will present a reversion in the signal of 
the coefficients. 
(7)             𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 − 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 
 Regarding the rest of the variables, in most of the cases the reversion of the 
signal also occurred, however none of the coefficients presented to be statistically 
significant.  
All in all, we were able to find results that support one of the considered 
hypotheses and reject the others. Indeed, an increase in the financial stress leads to a 
deterioration of the fiscal policy stance in the EU member country. Therefore, H4 was 
supported by the results of this study. Regarding the rest of the hypothesis, although 
the obtained coefficients were consistent with the statement of some of those 
hypothesis (H2 and H3), there was not enough statistical significance to support a direct 
relationship between these facts and therefore, reject the rest of the hypothesis. 
4.3 Robustness Test 
 To confirm the outcomes obtained in the baseline model, we performed some 
robustness tests. Firstly, instead of the use of the primary balance or expenditure as an 
indicator for the fiscal policy stance we used the cyclically adjusted primary balance 
(CAPB) following Szymanska (2016) and Ayuso et al. (2008). Forwardly, instead of using 
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the OLS (fixed effects) estimator, we used the 2SLS (IV-FE) estimator given that the first 
one could present a considerable bias10 when used in a dynamic panel regression. 
  The results of such regression are detailed in Table IV. Overall the outcomes 
derived from the application of the 2SLS present to be similar to the ones obtained with 
the OLS using the primary balance as dependent variable. For the EXPDEC variable, it 
remained statistically insignificant and the obtained coefficients are consistent with the 
ones obtained in Table II.  
The FSI coefficients stated in the columns (3), (5) and (6) show that the relation 
with the dependent variable remains negative, however they’ve lost their statistical 
significance. The loss of the statistical significance and the increase of the coefficients 
might be explained with the fact that the CAPB does not consider the cyclical component 
of the government budget, resulting in the exclusion of the effects that some temporary 
events (such as a financial crisis) might have in the balance. 
 Another difference in terms of statistical significance between the two tested 
models are the results stated for the variable Election. A slight statistical significance 
was obtained throughout the three regressions outcomes in which this variable was 
used. The results obtained in those regressions showed that when parliamentary 
elections take place the CAPB tend to be negatively affected by around 0.4% in those 
years. This relation is explained by Nordhaus (1974) that justifies it with the effort that 
the ruling party does in the pre-electoral period to provide a better condition to the 
 
10 According with the Judson and Owen (1999) 
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Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***significance at the 1% level; **significance at the 5% level; *significance 
at the 10% level. Instrumental variables are the t-2 and t-3 lags of the output gap, Tagkalakis (2012) 
 
population, i.e. an expansionary fiscal policy, and with that, increase the chances of re-
election. 
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4.4 Additional Study 
Motivated by the results obtained in the baseline model and in the robustness 
test we decided to perform further research in the connection of the fiscal policy stance 
to the decentralization levels and to the electoral cycle. 
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To complement the study on the connection between the decentralization of the 
government and the fiscal policy stance, we followed Baskaran (2010) and Afonso & 
Hauptmeier (2009) that also studied the connection of the FPS to the revenues 
decentralization and to the taxation decentralization. Separated regressions using a 
fixed effects estimator were performed for each one of these variables given the chance 
of a high correlation between them. The outcomes (presented in Table A. I) for the 
revenues decentralization are shown in the columns (1)-(2) and the obtained 
coefficients show that this kind of decentralization results in a negative impact on the 
primary balance and therefore in the fiscal policy stance of the EU countries, however 
due to the weak statistical significance of the obtained coefficients one cannot establish 
a direct connection between those two events [a similar result was obtained by 
Baskaran (2010)]. On the columns (3)-(4) the results of the regression using the taxation 
decentralization level as an explanatory variable show that a government that ends up 
in attributing tax responsibilities to sub-national levels of it, tends to present a lower 
primary balance. This statistically significant result is unexpected, however as it is 
explained by Baskaran (2010) the decentralization might take the regions to compete 
and therefore tend to reduce their tax levels to attract companies and individuals to 
their territory. 
Following the outcomes of the robustness test regarding the electoral calendar, 
we decided to check the hypothesis launched by Nordhaus (1974) who stated that after 
the elections, governments tend to correct their behaviour of the pre-electoral period. 
The findings of such connection are shown in Table A. II using a lagged Elections dummy 
variable.  According with the presented results, it is not possible to support Nordhaus 
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(1974) relation given the weakly statistically significant results. However, it is possible to 
claim that it cannot also be rejected given that in the years immediately after the 
Parliamentary Elections, the CAPB tended to be higher and therefore policy makers have 
a tendency to correct their pre-electoral behaviour after the elections period. 
5. Conclusion 
 With the monetary policy exhausted due to the effects of the previous financial 
crisis, the fiscal policy will have an important role to define the future economic growth 
of the European Union. It was with this premise that we started this study to analyse 
which one if not all the four considered variables of the fiscal policy stance have an 
impact on these policies. 
 Regarding the financial stress, it was proved that there is a connection between 
what is happening in the financial markets and the fiscal policy stance. According with 
the obtained results, policy makers tend to adapt the government economic policy when 
faced with such event to reduce its impact on the overall economy. Besides, from the 
outcome of our robustness test, it was proved that most of this adaptation comes from 
the cyclical component of the public budget. 
 For the government decentralization, we have not found evidences, given the 
absence of statistically significant outcomes, that when it is done in the expenditure side 
of the government budget, the fiscal policy stance tends to improve. However, as we 
found in our further research, if a government tend to delegate to sub-national 
authorities the taxation, this decision leads to a deterioration of the CAPB. We can 
explain such connection with the fact that regions tend to compete to attract companies 
and individuals to their territory with attractive tax levels. 
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 Considering the electoral calendar, we were not able to prove Nordhaus (1974) 
results and conclude that a relative austerity is applied in the early years of the mandate, 
and it ends with expansionary policies before the elections, however one cannot also 
reject such relation given the obtained outcomes. 
 Concerning the connection between the application of numerical fiscal rules in 
the EU member countries and its fiscal policy stance, we were not able to obtain a 
statistically significant result that prove such relation. This is a subject for which we 
recommend further research and therefore we would suggest it to future studies. The 
consideration of different datasets or the application of different regression estimators 
are some potential paths when approaching such connection. Furthermore, a focus on 
the partisan model to search for the impact of the ruling party ideology on the fiscal 
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Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***significance at the 1% level; **significance 
at the 5% level; *significance at the 10% level 
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Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
***significance at the 1% level; **significance at the 
5% level; *significance at the 10% level. Instrumental 
variables are the t-2 and t-3 lags of the output gap, 
Tagkalakis (2012) 
 
Table A. II - Results for the 2SLS (IV-FE) estimator with CAPB as dependent variable and 
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 Appendix B  
Graph B. I – Evolution of the number of numerical fiscal rules by type 
 
Graph B. II – Weight of each type of rule per government coverage 
 
Source: European Commission 
Source: European Commission 
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Graph B. III – Evolution of the FSI for France, 1990 - 2017 
 
 
Graph B. IV – Evolution of the FSI for Germany, 1990 - 2017 
 
Source: European Central Bank 
Source: European Central Bank 
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Graph B. V – Evolution of the FSI for Greece, 1990 - 2017 
 
 
Graph B. VI – Evolution of the FSI for Ireland, 1990 - 2017 
 
 
Source: European Central Bank 
Source: European Central Bank 
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Graph B. VII – Evolution of the FSI for Portugal, 1990 - 2017 
 
 
Graph B. VIII – Evolution of the FSI for Spain, 1990 - 2017 
 
 
Source: European Central Bank 
Source: European Central Bank 
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Table B. I - Codes of the variables collected from AMECO 
Variable Name AMECO Code 
Primary Balance UBLGI 
Primary Expenditure UUTGI 
Debt-to-GDP UDGG 
Output Gap AVGDGP 
Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance UBLGBP 
 
Table B. II - Results obtained in (1) for every EU member country, % 
 REVDEC EXPDEC TAXDEC 
 1995 2005 2010 2015 1995 2005 2010 2015 1995 2005 2010 2015 
Austria 36.39 34.10 34.70 35.00 33.58 32.61 34.17 34.06 7.87 6.09 6.31 6.02 
Belgium 41.63 44.01 45.38 49.03 39.23 41.47 43.63 49.06 10.56 15.01 15.74 19.17 
Bulgaria 28.67 20.38 22.67 25.85 27.78 22.25 21.33 27.20 16.33 2.56 3.88 4.06 
Croatia  30.79 32.51 30.78  28.68 27.45 28.46  15.35 18.25 17.40 
Cyprus 4.63 6.27 6.53 5.21 4.37 5.66 5.41 4.92 2.06 1.69 1.92 2.00 
Czech Republic 32.70 29.82 30.57 28.91 22.25 27.95 28.69 27.09 19.88 25.74 25.01 25.20 
Denmark 46.08 45.12 47.37 47.10 43.60 48.92 45.85 45.98 31.32 30.56 26.71 25.95 
Estonia 21.72 23.23 22.86 21.83 22.03 24.52 22.14 21.23 1.21 1.79 2.27 1.52 
Finland 44.96 41.82 49.09 47.52 35.02 42.80 44.16 45.39 32.36 28.50 34.60 33.55 
France 29.95 33.37 36.37 36.71 27.15 31.10 31.07 33.05 19.95 21.46 21.59 26.64 
Germany 59.56 61.22 60.78 62.06 50.54 58.75 56.62 62.71 48.24 49.52 48.44 50.87 
Greece 11.16 10.32 10.89 9.42 7.96 8.27 8.83 7.67 3.04 3.40 3.62 3.42 
Hungary 31.13 32.47 28.35 19.57 25.56 28.16 27.32 18.27 10.27 17.53 9.57 8.86 
Ireland 26.55 16.42 14.81 8.72 25.56 16.58 7.88 7.44 2.73 2.34 3.52 2.73 
Italy 29.63 38.55 37.94 36.33 25.26 36.39 35.13 33.15 11.49 22.79 21.30 21.86 
Latvia 30.68 31.29 35.16 30.64 27.93 30.09 30.56 28.25 30.38 23.54 29.25 26.21 
Lithuania 24.48 24.91 32.08 25.93 23.42 24.37 28.36 24.71 3.05 2.11 3.01 2.25 
Luxembourg 16.88 14.29 15.27 13.80 16.53 14.59 13.95 12.70 8.70 6.17 6.12 4.89 
Malta 1.64 1.50 1.71 1.50 1.41 1.36 1.48 1.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Netherlands 45.73 35.90 36.19 35.58 38.94 36.43 34.74 34.30 5.27 6.16 5.80 6.22 
Poland 23.80 37.81 38.81 38.31 25.58 34.03 35.24 36.04 12.24 20.22 19.28 21.10 
Portugal 15.25 17.33 18.80 16.87 13.15 15.44 15.98 13.86 7.53 9.33 9.50 10.12 
Romania 17.08 23.00 28.81 29.72 15.04 22.43 24.50 26.98 12.78 4.78 5.94 4.92 
Slovakia 10.04 22.78 23.33 22.05 15.96 20.85 20.86 20.22 6.28 3.85 4.35 2.92 
Slovenia 23.36 23.48 27.15 24.81 18.64 22.29 24.24 22.27 11.11 11.67 18.15 15.85 
Spain 43.04 52.57 55.98 53.50 37.95 53.68 54.30 51.45 21.10 33.49 34.92 35.86 
Sweden 42.23 42.31 43.90 44.78 37.61 42.24 43.42 45.29 33.66 34.45 32.87 32.83 
United Kingdom 24.19 24.42 26.95 23.00 22.32 23.70 22.85 21.18 4.49 5.66 6.08 5.88 
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Table B. III – Correlation Matrix 
 PB PE CAPB Debt Gap EXPDEC Election FSI Rules EMU SGP ENL 
PB 1            
PE -0.1956 1           
CAPB 0.8803 -0.0323 1          
Debt -0.029 0.2995 0.1605 1         
Gap 0.3534 -0.3284 -0.1258 -0.3602 1        
EXPDEC 0.2225 0.3853 0.2331 -0.0264 0.0147 1       
Election -0.0475 0.0053 -0.0615 0.0057 0.0154 0.0131 1      
FSI -0.3368 0.1612 -0.2108 0.0229 -0.2895 -0.0527 0.0419 1     
Rules 0.1671 0.0518 0.2547 0.0418 -0.1353 0.3004 0.0246 -0.2085 1    
EMU 0.1631 0.0308 0.1913 0.0895 -0.0242 0.0522 -0.0211 -0.031 -0.2165 1   
SGP 0.0379 0.1581 0.0895 0.3847 -0.0929 0.0805 0.016 0.0646 0.2039 -0.3173 1  
ENL -0.1531 -0.3176 -0.1902 -0.2613 0.0373 -0.2825 0.0123 -0.0187 0.0303 -0.2066 -0.2329 1 
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Table B. IV - Averages of all variables per country 
 PB PE CAPB Debt Gap EXPDEC REVDEC TAXDEC Elections FSI Rules EMU SGP ENL 
Austria 0.464 48.704 0.588 72.568 -0.121 33.503 34.876 6.401 0.321 0.123 0.084 0.143 0.679 0.000 
Belgium 2.940 46.792 2.901 105.799 0.083 42.986 44.566 14.750 0.250 0.142 0.255 0.143 0.679 0.000 
Bulgaria 1.948 34.309 1.834 36.756 0.381 22.315 22.582 8.170 0.321 0.124 0.366 0.000 0.000 0.393 
Croatia -1.514 45.109 -1.371 54.913 -0.322 28.483 31.070 17.032 0.214 0.098 -0.564 0.000 0.000 0.179 
Cyprus -0.180 35.531 -0.095 67.900 -0.022 4.802 5.416 1.921 0.214 0.101 -0.450 0.000 0.357 0.500 
Czech Republic -2.238 41.787 -1.843 28.454 0.064 26.809 29.253 23.234 0.321 0.141 -0.864 0.000 0.000 0.500 
Denmark 2.931 51.458 2.953 41.354 -0.432 46.350 46.060 28.946 0.286 0.111 0.518 0.143 0.000 0.000 
Estonia 0.510 37.765 0.496 6.819 0.029 22.935 22.274 1.885 0.250 0.138 0.942 0.000 0.250 0.500 
Finland 1.951 51.813 2.481 46.015 -0.911 42.489 44.011 31.146 0.250 0.192 0.348 0.143 0.679 0.000 
France -0.995 51.497 -0.808 73.891 -0.300 30.785 33.965 22.714 0.214 0.125 -0.201 0.143 0.679 0.000 
Germany 0.563 43.687 0.557 66.493 0.012 59.744 61.130 49.833 0.286 0.126 0.321 0.143 0.679 0.000 
Greece -1.368 43.188 0.055 127.491 -1.851 8.539 10.867 3.349 0.321 0.161 -0.635 0.143 0.607 0.000 
Hungary -0.030 44.504 -0.042 68.472 -0.484 24.614 28.078 12.610 0.250 0.151 -0.656 0.000 0.000 0.500 
Ireland -0.556 34.579 -0.923 60.999 0.549 18.907 19.408 2.647 0.214 0.198 -0.459 0.143 0.679 0.000 
Italy 2.291 43.181 2.585 110.668 -0.511 33.413 35.667 20.087 0.250 0.130 0.114 0.143 0.679 0.000 
Latvia -1.050 36.359 -0.940 23.419 -0.340 31.221 32.896 26.145 0.321 0.110 -0.266 0.000 0.143 0.500 
Lithuania -1.775 36.271 -1.691 25.882 -0.277 25.166 26.778 2.520 0.286 0.106 0.124 0.000 0.107 0.500 
Luxembourg 2.263 41.229 2.498 13.359 -0.114 14.726 15.308 6.788 0.179 0.151 0.107 0.143 0.679 0.000 
Malta -0.781 38.093 -0.733 60.475 -0.101 1.436 1.634 0.000 0.250 0.125 -0.569 0.000 0.357 0.500 
Netherlands 0.579 42.412 1.034 58.019 -0.477 35.481 36.414 5.800 0.286 0.101 0.855 0.143 0.679 0.000 
Poland -1.255 41.512 -1.021 46.664 -0.469 33.468 35.987 18.286 0.286 0.111 0.384 0.000 0.000 0.500 
Portugal -1.415 42.388 -1.217 82.299 0.083 15.259 17.220 9.101 0.286 0.105 -0.148 0.143 0.679 0.000 
Romania -1.238 34.045 -1.218 23.810 -0.061 21.988 24.398 7.015 0.286 0.136 -0.189 0.000 0.000 0.393 
Slovakia -2.590 40.985 -2.633 41.273 -0.073 17.134 18.567 5.217 0.321 0.105 0.036 0.000 0.321 0.500 
Slovenia -1.506 44.781 -1.281 39.027 -0.417 22.398 24.482 13.978 0.286 0.135 -0.768 0.000 0.393 0.500 
Spain -0.978 38.987 -0.256 64.701 -1.071 49.471 51.538 32.125 0.286 0.126 0.565 0.143 0.679 0.000 
Sweden 2.133 51.003 2.491 48.983 -0.929 43.018 42.839 33.767 0.250 0.134 0.676 0.143 0.000 0.000 
United Kingdom -1.342 37.624 -1.130 54.590 -0.385 22.827 24.086 5.464 0.250 0.119 0.102 0.143 0.000 0.000 
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Table B. V – Summary of Im-Pesaran-Shin panel unit root test 
Variable Statistic P-value Cross-sections 
PB -5.6655 0.0000 28 
PE -6.3114 0.0000 28 
CAPB -5.1262 0.0000 28 
Gap -6.7653 0.0000 28 
EXPDEC -3.6210 0.0001 28 
REVDEC -2.3368 0.0097 28 
TAXDEC -1.8643 0.0311 28 
FSI -10.6768 0.0000 28 
Rules -2.3599 0.0091 28 
Debt -1.0981 0.1361 28 
Debt (first difference) -9.1863 0.0000 28 
* Automatic selection of lags using HQIC (Liew, 2004) 
